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Acquisition policy and, even more so, acquisition practice today presumes that 
certainty is key to success, and that uncertainty or delays in achieving certainty regarding 
user needs or solution approach will necessarily impede progress. This means that when 
uncertainty arises during an acquisition effort, the natural response is to make decisions that 
resolve this uncertainty. Uncertainties arise for various reasons, such as poorly understood, 
conflicting, or changing needs. If, under pressure to maintain progress, an acquisition effort 
makes decisions to resolve these uncertainties without sufficient information, expertise, or 
deliberation, they are really only creating an illusion of certainty; in a practical sense, the 
uncertainty still exists. This artificial certainty then leads to flaws such as insufficient detail 
concerning specific needs or premature limiting of solution options. A new approach to 
acquisition is needed that recognizes that hiding uncertainty is detrimental to success. 
Systematically exposing uncertainties will be beneficial toward making acquisitions more 
flexible, cost-effective, and responsive to changing needs. 
The Requirements Challenge in Acquisition 
The purpose of the acquisition system is to acquire products that provide users in an 
enterprise (e.g., warfighters) with capabilities needed to perform their mission effectively and 
efficiently. To this end, user needs must be understood in terms of opportunities for 
improving the enterprise’s operational systems. Based on this understanding, a product 
must then be conceived/identified, acquired/developed (engineered and manufactured), 
deployed, and sustained/evolved. As long experience has shown, many challenges arise in 
trying to determine actual user needs and achieve a satisfactory product that properly 
addresses those needs. The essence of those challenges is achieving a balance among 
needed capabilities, enabling technology, cost, and timeliness in providing a product. 
The beginning of the acquisition life cycle is the identification of user needs and 
technology opportunities that suggest the potential for improved capabilities. These needs 
are progressively refined, elaborated, and reviewed to create specifications of requirements 





conformant product. Again, proper understanding of actual needs in sufficient detail to 
permit acquisition of a product that meets those needs is a significant challenge, but, further, 
needs to be met by a product are not static but continue to change. Future sustainability and 
improvement requires an acquirer and developer of a product to understand not only 
existing needs and technologies but how those needs and technologies are likely to evolve 
in the future. 
What experience and numerous studies over the years by the Department of 
Defense, Office of Management and Budget, Government Accountability Office, National 
Academies, and industry groups, have suggested is that properly determining needs and 
expressing these as requirements for product acquisition is difficult and prone to inflexibility 
and error. For example, quoting from the Defense Science Board Report (2009): “Today, 
‘requirements’ are used to define capability needs, implying that nothing less than a 
specified set of criteria is sufficient. Instead, a more prudent answer is to buy the best 
capability affordable, in the quantity desired, and fielded in as timely a manner as possible.” 
However, even this opinion fails to fully address how the acquisition approach could be 
improved so that products would better address both current and future needs. The 
following discussion proposes the notion that premature decision making, leading to only an 
illusion of certainty, is a factor in the requirements problem and that a greater awareness 
and explicit accommodation of uncertainty throughout the acquisition process would be 
beneficial. 
Understanding the Concept of Requirements 
“Requirements” is a term that everyone understands on an intuitive level but it can 
specifically mean many different things. In acquisition policy (USD (AT&L), 2008) 
requirements is used variously to mean: 
 Capabilities needed by a community of users (e.g., mission, user, or capability 
requirements) 
 Rules that must be followed in performing acquisition activities (e.g., statutory 
and regulatory requirements) 
 Criteria against which the acceptability of a product development effort will be 
evaluated (e.g., program requirements) 
 A specification of the expected behavior of a product being acquired (e.g., 
product, operational, or system requirements) (i.e., the guidance that product 
developers are given to know what to build or to describe what has been built) 
In a general sense, all of these uses are consistent but the practical implications of 
each for acquisition differ substantially. In particular, user requirements, program 
requirements, and system requirements are all different expressions of the single notion that 
a product is needed that will allow users to perform their mission more effectively. For an 
acquisition to be successful, all of these expressions must be consistent. 
In fact, however, this presents a dilemma: acquisition rules require that an acquisition 
program can proceed only after its requirements have been approved. Program 
requirements are derived based on user requirements and are the basis for defining product 
requirements. With respect to an envisioned or existing product, its requirements can be 
thought of as a model of the observable behavior that the product must exhibit to provide the 





program and product requirements unless there is a means for modifying them during the 
course of product development. 
What the experience of many people suggests, supported by recurring government 
and industry studies, is that requirements at any level of detail are often flawed: incomplete, 
inaccurate, misunderstood, and prone to unforeseen change. The best means we have for 
mitigating these flaws is systematic iteration through all aspects of product development, 
allowing for the progressive refinement of a shared understanding of needs, constraints, 
potential solutions, and tradeoffs. If acquisition policy or practice dictates that requirements 
at some point early in the acquisition process must be viewed as complete and immutable, it 
is likely that resulting products will both embody difficult-to-correct flaws and fail to keep up 
with changing needs. 
The acquisition system today seems to encourage, and practitioners conform to, the 
idea that a proper acquisition depends on achieving certainty, in requirements and in the 
cascade of subsequent decisions that flow through the acquisition process. What they 
actually achieve is the appearance of certainty but such certainty can in fact be an illusion 
built upon premature, inadequately reasoned decisions, inadequate understanding of needs, 
and failure to account for changing needs, technology, and operational context. Explicit 
recognition and accommodation of uncertainties is a way around this dilemma that will help 
programs avoid commonly experienced cost overruns, schedule delays, and product 
defects, while supporting concerns for proper accountability. 
Causes of Uncertainty in Requirements 
In thinking about the nature of requirements, we can easily identify several potential 
sources of uncertainty. To properly understand and specify requirements, these need to be 
exposed, analyzed, and documented with rationale: 
 Incomplete knowledge. User needs are usually specified by people who are 
knowledgeable in the mission of the enterprise and how it currently works. 
However, they often have only limited knowledge of how those needs may be 
realized in solution products, how different aspects may interact in a solution, or 
how new solutions could change the way the enterprise works; as a result, they 
may express needs in ways that unintentionally seem to limit the potential 
solution. Furthermore, there are usually aspects of user needs about which even 
experts disagree. Because no one can have complete knowledge of all aspects 
of any endeavor, it is likely that any description of user needs will mask areas of 
uncertainty or disagreement. Customers may recognize that this uncertainty 
exists but, lacking a proper awareness of the need and means to communicate 
the variety of alternatives that they see, they may instead make a reasoned but 
ultimately arbitrary choice. 
 Imprecise understanding of needs. While customers may be competent to define 
user needs, developers are likely to lack the same depth of understanding. 
Experts in a field may share assumptions, concepts, and terminology that enable 
them to describe needs in simpler terms that acquisition agents or developers 
with less of that expertise may misinterpret. It may not be apparent that 
developers have a different understanding until a product exists and its behavior 
can be observed in use. Needs are often better understood after potential 





exposure to knowledgeable users, leading then to being able to define better 
requirements. 
 Differing needs among users. Users doing similar jobs may in fact legitimately 
not have exactly the same needs. If requirements characterize all users doing 
similar jobs as having the same needs, the developer may create a product that 
properly meets the needs of only some users. A product that imposes a particular 
viewpoint on all such users will make some of those users less effective. 
 Changing needs. Needs change over time because of changes in mission, 
operational context, and technology. Defining needs only from the perspective of 
a single point in time ensures that these are inaccurate with respect to other 
times. Framing needs as fixed without consideration of potential change over 
time imposes uncertainty on what is potentially predictable change that may be 
better accommodated by developers if known. 
Why Apparent Certainty in Requirements May Be an Illusion 
By the time a product is deployed, its actual (“as-built”) requirements have been 
effectively determined. Still, although in a practical sense there can be no actual 
uncertainties about the behavior of a deployed product, there may not be a complete and 
accurate specification of what those requirements are. In that sense, there may be no one 
who can be certain about all aspects of the product’s behavior. 
Although acceptance of a product depends on compliance with acceptance criteria 
usually expressed in the form of requirements, the same problem can exist for those: there 
may be unacknowledged uncertainties that have been improperly resolved. In a process in 
which encountered uncertainties are simply decided away, without proper identification and 
systematic analysis of factors and tradeoffs, and not documented with rationale, it is likely 
that some uncertainty still exists relative to actual current or future needs. This same 
argument applies as the reasoning behind particular requirements is traced back through 
acquisition decision making. 
Uncertainty can exist at any level of requirements. The fundamental uncertainty is 
how does someone determine and communicate what they want or need. That phrase itself 
reveals a basic issue: how do we distinguish aspects that we must have from what we might 
like to have from what we would accept. The essence of engineering is identifying and 
weighing tradeoffs among alternatives but the nature of defining requirements is not only to 
make a definitive statement about what a customer needs but in doing that to also eliminate 
unsuitable solutions. When this is done without full knowledge of actual possibilities, 
potential solutions can be prematurely constrained. 
In looking at how requirements are determined, there are many factors that can lead 
to the various kinds of uncertainty: 
 No individual or collection of people will have complete knowledge of all aspects 
of an existing system and its operational context; requirements are inevitably only 
a partial description that requires particular expertise for correct understanding. 
 It is not possible to communicate all that an individual or collection of people 
know about a system or how it might be improved; a complete description of 





 Among a collection of people, even with similar spans and depths of knowledge 
in an area, there will be disagreements, some that can be resolved and some 
that are fundamental; the conventional answer is to insist on achieving 
agreement, even though the substance of the disagreement may itself provide 
more accurate insight into a correct solution than either individual or consensus 
viewpoint. 
 Even if people are able to correctly characterize needs at a point in time, needs 
as well as enabling technologies change over time; requirements that only 
describe what is needed currently will be incorrect at other times in the future. 
 Both natural language and graphical notations are frequently understood 
differently by different people, particularly when lacking similar expertise; two 
examples of gaps in communications are between users and developers and 
between systems engineers and software engineers. 
There are other factors in the nature of requirements that can also lead to 
uncertainties about the needed product: 
 Users typically view their needs in terms of being able to accomplish their job and 
new or improved capabilities that would enhance this; this view is often 
constrained by inaccurate assumptions about what is possible and what can and 
cannot be changed. 
 When a product built to address users’ needs is deployed, it often changes the 
users’ perceptions not only of what their needs are but also of what is possible, 
leading to their needs “changing” yet again. 
 Requirements being only approximate descriptions of needs and constraints on 
potential solutions may in fact omit information that the customer knows and 
assumes but that the product developer does not. 
 Requirements are frequently not limited to what is absolutely needed but also 
reflects the customer’s perception of what is desirable without distinguishing 
between these; this in fact often precludes options that would allow the developer 
to make better tradeoffs in creating a product that is a best fit to purpose within 
given cost and schedule constraints. 
Using Uncertainty in Writing Better Requirements 
Parnas and Clements (1986) argue for the ideal of a rational process for the design 
and building of (software) products. As part of this, they characterize requirements as a 
definition of the expected observable behavior of a needed product, sufficient to answer 
developer questions about what is to be built. A way to understand this is to recognize that 
requirements constitute a model of a needed product. From this perspective, requirements 
should define the capabilities that a product needs to enable for its users. 
However, it is not enough to describe a product at a fixed point in time and with 
uncertainties hidden. In fact, Parnas and Clements argued that a rational process is not 
usual practice because of incomplete and inaccurate information in documentation caused 
by underlying issues in how documents are written (e.g., poorly organized, stream of 
consciousness exposition, poorly and inconsistently written by multiple authors, dispersed 
repetition of related or conflicting information, confusing and inconsistent terminology, 





certainty. Authors must produce requirements that appear certain even if uncertainty has not 
been properly resolved. No means is given to indicate areas of uncertainty, doubt, or likely 
change that are left to be resolved. 
A common effect of resolving uncertainty with arbitrary decisions is to prematurely 
limit solution options. Not having a means of specifying requirements so as to permit 
alternative solutions, the customer may instead resort to describing a particular solution that 
has worked for similar problems in the past. By hiding the uncertainty and precluding further 
analysis, the developer may be forced to adopt the described solution rather than having the 
option of developing and evaluating other potentially more appropriate solutions. 
A factor in being able to evolve a product as user needs change is the ability to 
recover the rationale for why requirements are what they are. Some products today include 
obsolete capabilities and are difficult to change simply because no one is sure why the 
product does all that it does, why it is built the way it is, and whether any aspects of what it 
does are no longer needed by users. A natural by-product of focusing on and explicitly 
analyzing uncertainties is that the rationale for the resolution actually chosen will be 
documented. By capturing this rationale, we have at least a partial characterization for the 
product not only as it finally exists but also as it might have been differently done, giving a 
basis from which to revise the product when needs change. 
An Existing Approach for Limited Accommodation of 
Uncertainty 
Some experience already exists with building products with a focus on uncertainty. 
When an organization has a need to build multiple products, in support of customers having 
similar but not identical needs, a product line approach provides a process for building a set 
of similar products from a common base of reusable software, documentation, and test 
assets (Campbell, Faulk & Weiss, 1990; Clements & Northrop, 2002). This approach 
depends on identifying precisely the ways in which the needed products will be alike 
(commonalities) and the ways in which they will differ (variabilities). The techniques for 
identifying how products will differ and in resolving those differences to create a specific 
product is similar to the model proposed for identifying and resolving requirements 
uncertainties in general. 
With a product line approach, not all types of uncertainty are addressed but only 
those related to customers’ changing or diverse needs. Uncertainties related to potential 
changes in customer needs or to needs that differ among customers are systematically 
identified and formulated as decisions that will be resolved late in the production of each 
specific product in consultation with the individual customer for that product. The ability to 
resolve these uncertainties in different ways is systematically engineered as production 
options. This provides the means to deliver a customized product to each customer and to 
deliver a revised product to each customer as their needs change. Identifying decisions that 
encapsulate the implications of diverse and changing customer needs on product 
requirements for a set of customized products is integral to the concept of a product line. 
This approach also provides the means to rapidly build alternative solutions to particular 





A Strategy for Comprehensively Accommodating Uncertainty 
A recent National Academies study (Achieving Effective, 2009) has recommended 
that system requirements (“big R”) for IT systems be defined strictly and fixed at the mission 
capabilities level and that more detailed requirements (“little r”) continue to be developed 
and refined throughout the acquisition process. Consistent with the challenges of 
uncertainty, this study advised that requirements evolve progressively through ongoing 
interactions with end users and assessments of available technologies. The study alluded to 
a recent Joint Capabilities Integration Development System policy that prescribed a similar 
approach. 
Uncertainty in requirements is not a “problem” to be eliminated. Recognizing and 
properly exposing uncertainty is an aid to communicating more effectively about needs and 
potential solutions. Some uncertainties, once recognized as such, can be resolved through 
an analysis of alternatives and tradeoffs during the development process; others are 
inherent aspects of the problem being addressed and require different resolutions over time 
or for different customers. From experience with product lines, there are good techniques for 
expressing uncertainty which can guide developers in providing needed flexibility with 
mechanisms for tailoring and product customization to better accommodate the needs of 
customers over time. 
A strategy comprising three elements will give the means to better expose and 
resolve or accommodate uncertainties in requirements: 
 View product development as a process whose ancillary purpose is the 
elaboration, refinement, and correction of requirements as initially defined. 
 Document all differences and their implications when domain experts have 
differing views on any aspect of requirements. 
 For any aspect of requirements for which there are alternatives, that are the 
subject of tradeoffs, or that may change in the future, document the rationale for 
its current realization in comparison with identified alternatives. 
These elements together are meant both to improve the requirements as a 
description of the product being acquired and also to provide the basis for revising those 
requirements as understanding of needs improve or when needs or technology change in 
the future. When uncertainties exist and are resolved, capturing the rationale provides 
valuable insight to future developers. When needs change, this rationale provides a basis 
for understanding the implications of having to differently resolve those previous 
uncertainties in order to revise the product. To build a product, all requirements’ 
uncertainties have to be resolved in some way to finally build a product, but the goal is to not 
resolve an uncertainty prematurely or for all time. 
A key focus suggested in a proposed roadmap for improving software producibility 
was bridging the conceptual gap between customers and product developers, based on 
recognizing that there are alternative ways of expressing any problem and many potential 
solutions that can result (Campbell, 2008). With this perspective, no specific expression of 
requirements is the “right” one; rather different expressions may be suitable for different 
purposes. However, underlying all valid expressions are a set of assumptions about 
certainty, which aspects of needs and associated potential solutions are intrinsic and fixed 
and which are tradable and changeable. In product lines, these assumptions, of 





framework within which uncertainties are identified as choices that customers and 
developers must make through an ongoing process of evaluation and refinement over the 
life of a needed product. 
As is true for product lines, a shift to uncertainty-based acquisition does not require 
major changes in acquisition policy but rather a change in the level at which programs are 
required to establish binding requirements (Campbell, 2002). These should be at the level of 
observable mission-enabling capabilities to be achieved through an iterative process of 
learning and refinement rather than with a premature over-constrained specification of a 
specific top-down solution to narrowly conceived needs. This will require changes in the 
practice of acquisition, replacing the illusion of certainty with a process that, by exposing 
uncertainties, builds a stronger foundation for the efficient, predictable delivery of correct 
and effective capabilities needed by customers. 
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